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STABLE CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
 
Craig Calcaterra* 
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Vadhindran Rao*** 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The authors examine the emergence and proliferation of stable 
cryptocurrencies and their uses. After evaluating the core shortcomings 
associated with fiat currencies, the authors highlight the benefits of stable 
cryptocurrencies for monetary policy making, overall market stability, and 
their bilateral impact on the emergence of decentralized commerce. The 
transition to digital currencies has already started. It is a matter of time 
until the use cases and applications of stable cryptocurrencies become more 
mainstream.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Contemporary society is expeditiously embracing decentralized solutions 
for human interaction. Increasingly complex frameworks, theories and 
models are needed to understand the issues facing contemporary societies.1 
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** Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minneapolis, Minn.) 
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1. 
The market was seen as the optimal institution for the production and exchange 
of private goods. For nonprivate goods, on the other hand, one needed “the” 
government to impose rules and taxes to force self-interested individuals to 
contribute necessary resources and refrain from self-seeking activities . . . Scholars 
are slowly shifting from positing simple systems to using more complex 
frameworks, theories, and models to understand the diversity of puzzles and 
problems facing humans interacting in contemporary societies. 
Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 
100 AM. ECON. REV. 641, 641-642 (2010). 
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Stable cryptocurrencies have been defined as a type of cryptocurrency that 
is designed to maintain a stable value, rather than experiencing significant 
price changes.2 Others define them as constituting “a new class of 
cryptocurrencies which offer price stability and/or are backed by reserve 
asset(s), [combining] the instant processing and security of payments of 
cryptocurrencies, and the volatility-free stable valuations of fiat 
currencies.”3 A common denominator between these definitions is the 
stability of the currency. Stable cryptocurrencies offer the public the 
prospect of access to the crypto-ecosystem built on the stability and 
endurance of the existing financial system. Stable cryptocurrencies offer 
investors the prospect of a safe haven when markets are volatile. They also 
eschew the costly fiat-to-crypto conversion (and vice versa) for those 
investors who wish to avoid conversion from crypto to fiat currency but 
require price stability.  
In drawing comparisons between central banks’ monetary policy-making 
and decentralized attempts at monetary policy-making, it is important to 
note that such comparisons are inaccurate and incomplete when only 
considering the industrialized world. Rather, any monetary policy solution 
comparisons need to be made on a global scale. Taking into account 
countries with monetary policies that fall short of the objectives outlined by 
the Western world allows for a comparison of stable cryptocurrencies’ 
policy means and features that can actually add value in countries afflicted 
by instability and lacking government policies. For instance, most 
comparisons of stable cryptocurrencies with fiat currencies, such as the 
United States dollar, fall short because the complexities of policy-making 
in a fully operational system do not yet exist in nascent technologies’ 
emulation of monetary policy-making. Yet, conceptually, the technological 
solutions provided by stable cryptocurrencies can underscore what 
technology-driven optimization of policy-making is possible, even in fully 
operational and complex systems.  
The transition to stable cryptocurrencies in the private sector has already 
started. For example, IBM’s blockchain-powered payments network, World 
 
 
2. Stablecoin, BINANCE ACADEMY, https://www.binance.vision/glossary/stablecoin 
[https://perma.cc/5YEU-KCNF].  
3. Stablecoin, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stablecoin.asp 
[https://perma.cc/2RLT-5K3A]. 
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Wire, has already attracted several international banks who will issue their 
own stable cryptocurrencies, backed by the national fiat currencies in their 
home jurisdictions.4 Moreover, various central banks and governments are 
experimenting with cryptocurrency solutions.  This article shows that stable 
cryptocurrencies are an essential element for the evolution of money and 
decentralized systems.  
 
I. FIAT CURRENCIES 
 
A growing body of evidence suggests that fiat currencies and associated 
monetary policies are subject to significant shortcomings. Existing 
government-sponsored fiat currencies are not tied to a physical commodity 
that provides a valuation basis.5  In 2018, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) estimated that ten countries are at 20% or higher inflation.6 Using 
black market exchange rates measured weekly, the Cato Institute’s Troubled 
Currencies Project estimates that the real rates are significantly higher than 
the IMF estimates.7 Currency devaluation is rampant in many countries, 
including Venezuela (2018: -99%),8 Argentina (2018: -51.85%),9 Turkey 
 
 
4. Marie Huillet, Six Global Banks Sign Up to Issue Stablecoins on IBMs Now-Live Blockchain 
Network, COINTELEGRAPH (March 18, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/six-global-banks-sign-
up-to-issue-stablecoins-on-ibms-now-live-blockchain-network [https://perma.cc/X48N-LLRL]. 
5. Sandra Kollen Ghizoni, Nixon Ends Convertibility of US Dollars to Gold and Announces 
Wage/Price Controls, FED. RESERVE HIST.  (Nov. 22, 2013), 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/gold_convertibility_ends [https://perma.cc/8AXE-
TAJD]. Nixon in 1971 separated the value of the U.S. dollar from the gold standard, in part because a 
growing consensus among policy makers acknowledged the weakening of the gold-tied dollar in 
comparison to enterprises that were not tied to the price of gold. Id. 
6. Inflation Rate, Average Consumer Prices Annual Percent Change, IMF DATA MAPPER 
(2019), https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD 
[https://perma.cc/MJ5M-77LQ]. 
7. Steve H. Hanke & Tal Boger, Inflation by the Decades: Full Dataset, CATO INST. (Aug. 
2018), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/troubled-currencies-project-site/inflation-by-the-
decades-full-data-set.xlsx [https://perma.cc/AX7K-RX2K]. According to the Troubled Currencies 
Project, which is a joint project with Johns Hopkins University, six countries are experiencing over 
100% annual inflation. Id. 
8. Brian Ellsworth & Girish Gupta, Venezuela Announces 99.6 Percent Devaluation of Official 
Forex Rate, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-
economy/venezuela-announces-99-6-percent-devaluation-of-official-forex-rate-idUSKBN1FP2WK 
[https://perma.cc/X2TT-NM43]. 
9. Sam Meredith, Argentina’s Peso Has Now Fallen 52% Against the Dollar This Year, CNBC 
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/31/argentinas-peso-has-fallen-108percent-against-the-
dollar-so-far-this-year.html [https://perma.cc/WAU3-HWPK]. 
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(2018: -35%),10 and Brazil (2018: -18.7%).11 Government-controlled fiat 
currencies are as dependent on the faith of the people in the implicit or 
explicit government guarantees as are any other form of currency not yet 
fully adopted, such as stable cryptocurrencies.12  
 
A. Arbitrary Policy Outcomes 
 
The unfettered discretion of policy makers can lead to arbitrary 
outcomes.13 Policymakers in any given country have the ability to 
unilaterally decide to devalue assets in that country.14 The supply of goods 
and services in any given economy can be changed through arbitrary 
decisions by policymakers or a central bank.15 Central bankers’ ability to 
determine when to print money as monetary policy can significantly affect 
inflation.16 Monetary policy-making for fiat currencies is largely lacking 
transparency, which does not allow for anticipatory market action based on 
policy indicators.17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Roger Aitken, Turkish Lira ‘Currency Crisis’ Not Over, Could Hit 8 Against U.S. Dollar, 
FORBES (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2018/08/16/turkish-lira-currency-
crisis-not-over-could-hit-8-against-u-s-dollar/#472187cd2301 [https://perma.cc/4UF8-REED]. 
11. Lise Alves, With Depreciation of Currency, Brazilians Spend Less Abroad, RIO TIMES (Dec. 
24, 2018), https://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-business/with-depreciation-of-currency-
brazilians-spend-less-abroad [https://perma.cc/KJ8M-C4JR]. 
12. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 220 (Cengage Learning, 7th ed. 2014).  
13. Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences 
of Changes in the Mode of Governance, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y 139, 141-43 (1997).   
14. Christina Majaski, Devaluation, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/devaluation.asp [https://perma.cc/A2CR-4JVX]. 
15. Khaled Abdel-Kader, What Are Structural Policies?, 50 FIN. & DEV. 46, 46-47 (2013). 
16. See John C. Williams, Monetary Policy, Money, and Inflation, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. 
ECON. LETTER 2012-21, at 1 (2012) (noting that this is a “textbook” understanding of monetary theory, 
but arguing that developments following the 2008 recession may call this theory into question). 
17. See Narayana Kocherlakota, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Address at 17th 
Annual Entrepreneur & Investor Luncheon: Monetary Policy Transparency: Changes and Challenges 
(June 7, 2012) (transcript available at https://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-
speeches/monetary-policy-transparency-changes-and-challenges-20120607 [https://perma.cc/U56Q-
EBF6]) (discussing this problem and recent attempts to ameliorate it).   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/15
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B. Cost 
 
Cash-based economies are subject to costs.18 While only about one-third 
of all transactions in the United States economy are conducted using cash 
payments,19 many countries’ economies function primarily in cash. Several 
studies demonstrate that the poor and those with less access to institutions 
bear a disproportionate share of these costs of using cash.20 In the United 
States, for example, cash usage imposes a regressive tax on consumers, with 
the highest impact on people who do not have an account with a bank.21 
This impact is higher in countries that have a higher rate of cash usage. The 
cost increases further because the use of bank notes is inherently insecure: 
The theft of cash alone costs U.S. retail businesses around $40 billion 
annually.22   
The cost of printing paper notes is quite substantial and creates a burden 
on the economy. Printing one-dollar and two-dollar bills costs 5.5 cents per 
note, while five-dollar bills cost 11.4 cents, ten-dollar bills cost 11.1 cents, 
both twenty-dollar and fifty-dollar bills cost 11.5 cents, and one-hundred 
dollar bills cost 14.2 cents.23 In other words, the more a bill is worth, the 
more it costs to produce. In 2014, the United States government created 6.9 
billion paper notes, with a total value of $130.1 billion, which adds up to 
about 24.8 million notes per day.24 To make matters worse, the printing can 
never stop and continues to increase. In fiscal year 2018, the United States 
government planned on making 7.4 billion notes, valued at $233.4 billion, 
a 4% increase from the previous year.25  
 
 
18. Bhaskar Chakravorti, The Hidden Cost of Cash, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 26, 2014), 
https://hbr.org/2014/06/the-hidden-costs-of-cash [https://perma.cc/HBY2-FVMA]. 
19. See id. 
20. Id.  
21. Id.   
22. Will Yaowicz, Cash Costs U.S. Businesses $40 Billion a Year, INC., (Sept. 20, 2013), 
https://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/dealing-with-cash-costs-american-businesses-55-billion.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZVA9-69T7]. 
23. Currency and Coin, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/currency_12771.htm [https://perma.cc/VSD4-G4HE].  
24. Currency and Coin Services, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (June 10, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/coin_data.htm [https://perma.cc/C9RB-AJT5].   
25. 2018 Federal Reserve Note Print Order, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (Aug. 9, 
2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/2018_currency_print_orders.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VH65-MKDT]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Additionally, counterfeiting of bank notes has been an ongoing 
phenomenon for centuries. The counterfeit currency and the people’s belief 
in the government are both devalued each time counterfeit money gets 
disseminated into the market.26 The government is therefore tasked with 
protecting the currency’s integrity.27 Federal law prohibits the possession of 
counterfeit notes,28 as well as passing on, uttering (i.e., using as if genuine), 
and dealing with money—either domestic or foreign—with the intention of 
defrauding.29  
According to one study, $1 of every $12,400 of cash notes printed may 
be counterfeit.30 The cost of counterfeit response is significant. These costs 
are largely associated with upgrades to cash-processing equipment.31  Even 
in countries with low levels of counterfeit interference, the social cost of 
counterfeits is substantial.32 Some evidence exists that demand for bank 
notes declines after a counterfeiting shock in a given system.33 Stock prices 
of credit card and bank deposit entities increase after counterfeit incidents.34 
Such consequences are consistent with a loss of confidence in the currency.  
Physical bank notes result in untraceable transactions that facilitate 
corruption and exert a significant cost on the global economy. Corruption 
has well-documented negative economic effects.35 According to some 
 
 
26. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. 
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (establishing Congress’s prerogative to punish 
counterfeiting). In 1865, the Secret Service was established to go after money counterfeiters. At that 
time, one-third of U.S. currency was fake. USSS History, SECRET SERV., 
https://www.secretservice.gov/about/history/events/ [https://perma.cc/Z2LN-784V]. 
28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 470-514 (2018). 
29. Id. 
30. Costs of Keeping Ahead of Counterfeiters, FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, (Dec. 2009), 
https://www.richmondfed.org/-
/media/richmondfedorg/banking/payments_services/understanding_payments/pdf/costs_counterfeiters.
pdf [https://perma.cc/UHU5-5BXF]; Ruth Judson & Richard Porter, Estimating the Worldwide Volume 
of Counterfeit U.S. Currency: Data and Extrapolation,” DIVISION OF MONETARY AFF., BD. GOVERNORS 
FED. RESERVE SYS. (2003), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/FEDS/2003/200352/200352pap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3WRN-F8Z4]. 
31. Id.  
32. Nathan Viles, Alexandra Rush & Thomas Rohling, The Social Costs of Currency 
Counterfeiting, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL., (May 2015), 
https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/rdp/2015/2015-05/. [https://perma.cc/M7DN-EKS4]. 
33. Id. at 9. 
34. Id. at 16. 
35. BINYAM REJA & ANTTI TALVITIE, THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF CORRUPTION: WHAT 
IS THE DIFFERENCE IN CORRUPTION BETWEEN ASIA AND AFRICA, 22-24 (2000); J. Edgardo Campos, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/15
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studies, the annual cost of corruption on the global economy is $3.6 
billion.36 Economic growth is negatively affected by corruption in terms of 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in a given country, price stability 
and international trade, and bias in the composition of government 
expenditures.37 The World Bank suggests that corruption is the single 
greatest threat to social and economic development.38 Countries that address 
corruption can increase per capita incomes of their citizens by up to 400%.39 
 
 
Donald Lien & Sanjay Pradhan, The Impact of Corruption on Investment: Predictability Matters, 27 
WORLD DEV. 1059 (June 1999); Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, The  Role  of  Wages  and  
Auditing  During  a  Crackdown  on  Corruption  in  the  City  of  Buenos  Aires, 46 J. L. & ECON. 269, 
270 (2003); Axel Dreher, IMF and Economic Growth:  The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance 
with Conditionality, 34 WORLD DEV. 769 (2006); Michael Keating, Counting the Cost of the Culture of 
Corruption: A Perspective from the Field, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 317, 319-20 
(2007); Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh, Corruption's  Effect on  Growth  and  its  Transmission 
Channels, 57 KYKLOS 429 (2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=591558 [https://perma.cc/3H9P-SENG]; 
Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff,  The Modern  History  of  Exchange  Rate  Arrangements: 
A Reinterpretation, 119 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2004); Michael T. Rock & Heidi Bonnett, The Comparative 
Politics of Corruption:  Accounting for the East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, 
Growth and Investment, 32 WORLD DEV. 999 (2004); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 
108 Q.  J. ECON. 599 (1993); Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?, 82 
REV. ECON. STAT. 1 (2000); Shang-Jin Wei & Andrei Shleifer, Local Corruption and Global Capital 
Flows, 2000 BROOKING PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 303 (2000); Heinz Welsch, Corruption, Growth, 
and the Environment: A Cross-Country Analysis, 9 ENV’T AND DEV. ECON. 663 (2004); Arnold Zellner 
& Henri Theil, Three-Stage   Least   Squares:   Simultaneous   Estimation of Simultaneous Equations, 
ECONOMETRICA, Jan. 1962,  at 54, 54-78; Zvika Neeman, Daniele Paserman & Avi Simhon, Corruption  
and  Openness, Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem (Discussion Paper No. 8.03 2003), 
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/14977/files/dp030008.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PXH-K6VF]; 
Helene Poirson Ward, Economic Security, Private Investment, and Growth in Developing Countries 
(Int’l  Monetary  Fund, Working  Paper No.  98/4, 1998), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/Economic-Security-Private-Investment-
and-Growth-in-Developing-Countries-2456 [https://perma.cc/AY4P-RRJT]; Shang-Jin Wei & Yi Wu, 
Negative Alchemy?  Corruption and Composition of Capital Flows (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., 
Working Paper No. 8187, 2001), https://www.nber.org/papers/w8187 [https://perma.cc/4C24-453V]; 
Axel Dreher & Thomas Herzfeld, The Economic Costs of Corruption: A Survey and New Evidence (June 
2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=734184 [https://perma.cc/YA6K-34EJ]. 
36. Stephen Johnson, Corruption is Costing the Global Economy $3.6 Billion Dollars Every 
Year, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/12/the-global-
economy-loses-3-6-trillion-to-corruption-each-year-says-u-n [https://perma.cc/3HTW-H6QD]. 
37. See Dreher & Herzfeld, supra note 35. 
38. Corruption Hunters Rally for Action Against Fraud, THE WORLD BANK (Dec. 6, 2010), 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/12/06/corruption-hunters-rally-for-action-against-
fraud [https://perma.cc/X75S-T5YF]. 
39. The Costs of Corruption, WORLD BANK (Apr. 8, 2004), 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190187~menuPK:34457~
pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html [https://perma.cc/ANL8-J2XZ].  
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The social cost associated with corruption is holding humanity back in 
development and affects the poor disproportionately.40  
The effect of corruption on economic welfare is significant.41 Most 
studies capture the negative impact of corruption on economic development 
by focusing on the GDP and per capita growth of countries relative to the 
degree of corruption (i.e., more corrupt countries experience statistically 
significant lower GDP and investment rates).42  Similarly, more corrupt 
countries also experience significantly lower rates of investment.43  
Finally, the cost of bank notes in the economy is borne by society at large. 
In the United States, for instance, the annual value of underreported taxes is 
somewhere between $400 billion and $600 billion.44 The U.S. Treasury 
loses at least $50 billion annually because of the cash economy, even 
assuming that only half of this under-reporting by self-employed taxpayers 
can be traced back to cash.45 
 
 
40. The Costs of Corruption: Values, Economic Develop Under Assault, Trillions Lost, says 
Guterres, UN NEWS (Dec. 9, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/12/1027971 
[https://perma.cc/U2N5-BJBX].  
41. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 35.  
42. See Paulo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 701 (1995); Aymo Brunetti, 
Political Variables in Cross-Country Growth Analysis, 11 J. ECON. SURVS. 163, 184 (1997); Ward, 
supra note 35; Hongyi Li, Lixin Colin Xu & Heng-fu Zou, Corruption, Income Distribution, and 
Growth, 12 ECON. & POL. 155, 162-63 (2000); Pak-Hung Mo, Corruption and Economic Growth, 29 J. 
COMP. ECON. 66, 67 (2001); George T. Abed & Hamid R. Davoodi, Corruption, Structural Reforms, 
and Economic Performance in the Transition Economies (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 
00/132, 2000), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/Corruption-Structural-
Reforms-and-Economic-Performance-in-the-Transition-Economies-3697 [https://perma.cc/3NPK-
DBTU]; Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, Corruption, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality in Africa, 
3 ECON. GOVERNANCE 183 (2002); Pierre-Guillaume Meon & Khalid Sekkat, Does Corruption Grease 
or Sand the Wheels of Growth?, 122 PUB. CHOICE 69, 88 (2005); Isaac Ehrlich & Francis Lui, 
Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth, 107 J. POL. ECON. 270, 289-90 (1999); 
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido, Governance Matters (World Bank Pol’y Res. Working 
Paper No. 2196, 1999); Zvika Neeman, M. Daniele Paserman & Simhon Avi, Corruption and Openness, 
8 B.E. J. ECON.  ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1 (2008).  But see Pellegrini & Gerlagh, supra note 35, at 434; Raul 
A. Barreto, Endogenous Corruption, Inequality and Growth: Econometric Evidence (Univ. of Adelaide 
Sch. of Econ. Working Paper No. 2001-02, 2001). 
43. Mauro, supra note 42;  Aymo Brunetti, Greogory Kisunko & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, 
Credibility of Rules and Economic Growth: Evidence from a Worldwide Survey of the Private Sector, 
12 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 353 (1998); Aymo Brunetti & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Investment and 
Institutional Uncertainty: A Comparative Study of Different Uncertainty Measures, 134 REV. WORLD 
ECON. 513, 529 (1998); Campos et al., supra note 35; Mo supra note 42; Johann Graf Lambsdorff, How 
Corruption Affects Productivity, 56 KYKLOS 457 (2003). 
44. See Chakravorti, supra note 18. 
45. See id. (reporting that underpayment by self-employed individuals is $109 billion annually). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/15
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C. Capital Controls 
 
Fiat currencies can be subject to capital controls. While the majority of 
the Western developed world does not impose capital controls, leaving 
economic movement of capital to the markets, a wide variety of capital 
controls are used in emerging economies.46 Capital controls are instituted 
by some governments to restrict the inflow and outflow of capital into the 
economy in an attempt to ensure that the economy and currency stay 
relatively stable in the long run and to prevent currency volatility and 
inflationary swings.47   
Capital controls may be categorized as: (1) walled, characterized by long-
term capital control measures; (2) gated, characterized by systems in place 
to be turned on and off episodically; or (3) open, characterized by the 
absence of a system of control. 48 Capital controls are controversial. Some 
economists believe that implementing capital controls can help make 
economies more stable, because only investors that see long-term potential 
will invest in a country that employs capital controls.49  
 
II. TRANSITION TO DIGITAL CURRENCIES STARTED 
 
The transition of concepts of money from the existing bank notes (i.e., 
paper money), to digital currencies has already commenced. In the public 
sector, central banks and governments around the world have been 
experimenting with digital and cryptocurrencies.50 Several of those projects 
are in the proof-of-concept phase; others are near launch.51  
 
 
46. Andrés Fernández, Michael W. Klein, Alessandro Rebucci, Martin Schindler, & Martín 
Uribe, Capital Control Measures: A New Dataset 15 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 15/80, 
2015). 
47. See generally id. at 4-6. 
48. Id. at 13.  
49. Thomas Kostigen, Capital Controls Can Stabilize Developing Nations, MARKETWATCH 
(Jun. 22, 2012), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/capital-controls-can-stabilize-developing-nations-
2012-06-22 [https://perma.cc/LAY8-UGRP]. 
50. Garrick Hileman & Michel Rauchs, Global Cryptocurrency Benchmarking Study, 
CAMBRIDGE JUDGE BUS. SCH. (2017), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-research/centres/alternative-
finance/publications/global-cryptocurrency/#.XMHF_xNKhTY [https://perma.cc/YT7K-SARA].  
51. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text. 
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Increasing evidence suggests that bank notes are gradually losing ground 
to other payment systems.52 Whereas the overwhelming majority of humans 
live in cash economies where at least 90% of transactions are conducted in 
cash, consumers in wealthier economies tend to favor noncash 
alternatives.53 Illustrating this emerging trend, cash usage in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Canada, and 
France, among other industrialized nations, has fallen well below 50% of 
the total transaction volume.54 Most significantly, in Northern Europe, as 
few as one of every five transactions is made in cash.55 
 
A. Technological and Monetary Co-Evolution 
 
Technological evolution is tied to the evolution of money. However, 
while technology has been evolving at an unprecedented rate for the past 
several decades,56 concepts of money evolve much more slowly. Even 
deeply rooted cultural constraints, such as customary cash businesses, 
pertaining to money and finance, though, are unable to restrain 
technological progress in the long term.57 Money evolved from barter trade 
with livestock to coinage to bank notes.58 For example, starting over three 
thousand years ago, cowry shells, or copies of the shells, were used as 
Chinese currency.59  
 
 
52. KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH (Princeton University Press, 2016). 
53. Id. 
54.  “Germany, Japan, and Austria stand apart as wealthy countries where consumers maintain a 
strong preference for cash at the point of sale, despite universal availability of electronic payments 
instruments and the broad adoption of electronic transfers for recurring payments.” Id. 
55. Id.  
56. See Fenwick & Vermeulen, infra note 64.  
57. Other examples of technological evolution despite deep cultural constraints include Japan’s 
slow removal of individual seals dating pack to the shogun era. Personal Seals Lose Ground as Big 
Japanese Banks stop Using 1800s Technology, THE JAPAN TIMES, (Mar. 9, 2019), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/03/09/business/corporate-business/personal-seals-lose-
ground-big-japanese-banks-stop-using-1800s-technology/#.XIaxmtlOl-F [https://perma.cc/E64M-
7URZ]. 
58. Andrew Beattie, The History of Money: From Barter to Banknotes, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 7, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/roots_of_money.asp [https://perma.cc/S9PQ-SWFE]. 
59. Peter Boomgaard, Early Globalization Cowries as Currency, 600 BCE -1900, in LINKING 
DESTINIES: TRADE, TOWNS AND KIN IN ASIAN HISTORY 13-28 (Peter Boomgaard, Dick Kooiman & 
Henk Schulte Nordholt eds. 2008). The Classical Chinese character for "money/currency," 貝, originated 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/15
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For the last decade, technology has been advancing even more quickly.60 
Some core examples include artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, big data, 
and machine learning, among several others. The rapid advances of AI have 
already affected many sectors of the economy during the past decade.61  Big 
data—the ability to examine all data in an empirical study—in combination 
with AI and machine learning is a significant driver of disruptive 
innovation.62 Big data in the form of digitized data that grows at exponential 
rates and can be captured and manipulated electronically draws on several 
core sources including the internet of things, public records, social media, 
and cameras, as well as satellite tracking.63 The real surge of innovation 
appears to involve a combined effect of AI, big data, sensors, and 
blockchain technology.64 
 
 
as a pictograph of a cowrie shell. Id. Cowries were also formerly used as means of exchange in India. 
The Lydian state minted coins, most of the coins mentioning king Alyattes of Lydia. Id. 
60. See Fenwick & Vermeulen, infra note 64. 
61. See Craig E. Karl, The Three Breakthroughs That Have Finally Unleashed AI on the World, 
WIRED (Oct. 27, 2014, 6:30AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/future-of-artificial-intelligence/ 
[https://perma.cc/A8AX-42JP] (“Over the past five years, cheap computing, novel algorithms, and 
mountains of data have enabled new AI–based services that were previously the domain of sci–fi and 
academic white papers.”). 
62. See ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, 
PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 205–28 (2014); Tess Townsend, 
Peter Diamandis: A.I. Will Lead to Massive Disruption Across Industries, INC. (Sept. 24, 2015), 
http://www.inc.com/tess-townsend/diamandis-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/FMQ2-
44GC]. See James Canton, From Big Data to Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Disruption, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 5, 2016, 2:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-canton/from-big-
data-to-artifici_b_10817892.html [https://perma.cc/76B7-73UW]; Jitendra Waral, Anurag Rana & Sean 
Handrahan, Artificial Intelligence: Disruption Era Begins, BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL: BLOOMBERG 
INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 29, 2016),     https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/artificial-intelligence-
disruption-era-begins/ [https://perma.cc/MLT9-N2KE]; Rebecca Merrett, Intelligent Machines Part 1: 
Big Data, Machine Leaning and the Future, CIO (June 4, 2015 2:47 PM),           
http://www.cio.com.au/article/576664/intelligent-machines-part-1-big-data-machine-learning-future/ 
[https://perma.cc/6K69-9XGZ]. 
63. See Townsend, supra note 62; John Podesta, Penny Pritzker, Ernest J. Moniz, John Holdren, 
Jeffrey Zients, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA:  SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING 
VALUES 53 (2014), https://goo.gl/xtDerj [https://perma.cc/9HSW-LW8X] (“Big data technologies, 
together with the sensors that ride on the ‘Internet of Things,’ pierce many spaces that were previously 
private. Signals from home WiFi networks reveal how many people are in a room and where they are 
seated.”); See generally JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, 
COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 15 (McKinsey Glob. Inst., 2011). 
64. Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Technology and Corporate Governance: 
Blockchain, Crypto, and Artificial Intelligence, EUROPEAN CORP. GOVERNANCE INST. (Oct. 22, 2018).  
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The technological evolution takes place in common phases that may help 
predict future developments in emerging decentralized technologies. Every 
major technological innovation since the industrial revolution experienced 
an initial hype cycle, followed by a burst, as well as a short and a long 
proliferation cycle.65 For example, in recent history, the dot-com bubble in 
the 2000s created a massive hype cycle pertaining to the business 
opportunities and possibilities associated with internet technology and their 
possible use cases.66 The dot-com bubble burst in the early 2000s, giving 
birth to one of the greatest periods of consumer innovation in history.67 As 
part of the long-term proliferation cycle, cryptocurrencies and blockchain 
technology have the opportunity to expand the innovation and associated 
opportunities started during the early internet years.  
Decentralization protocols are at the very beginning of their evolutionary 
cycle. Just as the internet boom and dot-com bubble created Facebooks, 
Amazons, Googles and Apples,68 the evolution of decentralization protocols 
may give birth to the next generation of emerging technology and associated 
companies. Blockchain technology enabled a nascent industry with an 
unclear use case.69  Despite the initial hype cycle in 2017 and 2018, the 
industry is still nowhere near the required level of maturity. In order to 
emerge from the initial hype and boom cycle, decentralization technology 
has to mature and grow towards an understanding of capability. The number 
of decentralized infrastructure projects needed for the evolution cycle to 
start is significant. Significant decentralization project failures are 
necessary and useful while appropriate use cases are being explored. 
 
 
65. Dilantha De Silva, Is There a Bubble in the Making? The Dotcom Bubble and Today’s 
Market, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 16, 2018), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4212027-bubble-making-
dotcom-bubble-todays-market [https://perma.cc/6JKE-7N4Z]. 
66. Id. 
67. Id.  
68. See also Eric Jackson, Cryptocurrency Skeptics Warn of Another Dot-Com Bubble, But 
Remember: That’s Where Amazon and Google Started, CNBC (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/07/cryptocurrency-boom-just-beginning--commentary.html 
[https://perma.cc/5W6W-ZVW9]; see also Teri Robinson, Lasting Benefits of the Dot-Com Bubble, E-
COMMERCE TIMES (July 15, 2002), https://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/18570.html 
[https://perma.cc/M2NA-L676]. 
69. Febin John James, Popular Use Cases of Blockchain Technology You Need to Know, 
MEDIUM: HACKERNOON (Jan. 31, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/popular-use-cases-of-blockchain-
technology-you-need-to-know-df4e1905d373 [https://perma.cc/2ZZA-JSKN] (providing text 
explanations). 
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The emergence of stable cryptocurrency projects can be seen as an early 
indicator for the possible co-evolution of decentralized technology and 
money. For example, the rise of an early stable cryptocurrency design, 
Tether, in terms of its total market capitalization,70 its stability around $1 
value,71 and investors’ uses of Tether as a temporary safe haven,72 provides 
some support for stable cryptocurrencies’ ability to create market stability, 
even if only temporarily. Like all other stable cryptocurrency projects, 
Tether is still afflicted with significant design challenges.73 The emerging 
role of stable cryptocurrencies in decentralization protocols suggests that 
part of the evolution of such protocols may involve stability designs.  
 
B. Early Experimentation 
 
Governments, central banks, and the private sector have started 
experimenting with digital- and cryptocurrencies. In the case of central 
banks, such experimentation is already close to launch74 or fully 
operational.75 Several governments have issued their own digital currencies.  
 
 
70. Tether, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/tether 
[https://perma.cc/U3WP-9GEV] (last visited Apr 22, 2019). 
71. Johnson Gitonga, What is Tether (USDT) and How to Buy It?, YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 5, 
2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/tether-usdt-buy-090742535.html [https://perma.cc/6RHP-
HYWN] (discussing the stability of Tether at a $1 value)  
72. Evidence that shows that investors move crypto assets into Tether when the market gets more 
volatile.  
73. Tether’s issue with being pegged against the USD and with that subject to Centralized 
monetary policy.  Andrea Tan, Eric Lam & Benjamin Robertson, Crypto Markets Roiled as Traders 
Question Tether’s Dollar Peg, BLOOMBERG, (October 14, 2018, 11:30 PM CDT), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-15/dollar-peg-that-underpins-20-of-crypto-trades-
is-under-pressure [https://perma.cc/V7X5-YQKJ].  
74. The Bank of Canada and bank of England announced in 2016 that the technology was not 
ready for a central bank sponsored crypto currency. Yet, other central banks, such as in Singapore and 
Sweden have already launched their e-currency projects. Morten Bech & Rodney Garratt, Central Bank 
Cryptocurrencies, BIS Q. REV. 66-67 (Sept. 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3041906 
[https://perma.cc/9GYS-ER2J]. 
75. Usman W. Chohan, Cryptocurrencies as Asset-Backed Instruments: The Venezuelan Petro, 
(Feb. 7, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119606 [https://perma.cc/P3UH-F2ZR] (describing 
Venezuela’s oil token). Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Bans Venezuela’s New Crypto-Currency and Adds 3 
Officials to Sanctions List, 34 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 157, 157-161 (2018); Julie Hirschfeld Davis 
& Nathaniel Popper, White House Bans Venezuela’s Digital Currency and Expands Sanctions, N. Y. 
TIMES, (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/world/americas/trump-venezuela-
sanctions-petro.html [https://perma.cc/VH8G-86FD]. 
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Central banks and governments around the world have been 
experimenting with government-sponsored digital and cryptocurrencies 
since 2015.76 Examples include Tunisia (eDinar),77 Venezuela (Petro),78 
Senegal (eCFA),79 Sweden (eKrona),80 Dubai (EmCash),81 Japan (Jcoin),82 
 
 
76. Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Central 
Bank of Malaysia Monetary Policy Conference (July 24, 2017) (transcript available 
https://www.bis.org/review/r170807c.htm [https://perma.cc/PDA7-CWFF]); Digital Currency 
Initiative, MIT MEDIA LAB, https://dci.mit.edu/ [https://perma.cc/TK9P-EWQD]; Financial Stability 
Review 2017, MONETARY AUTH. OF SING. (Nov. 2017); Bech & Garratt supra note 74; see Hileman & 
Rauchs, supra note 50; Jack Meaning, Ben Dyson, James Barker & Emily Clayton, Broadening Narrow 
Money: Monetary  Policy with a Central Bank Digital Currency (Bank of Eng., Staff Working Paper 
No. 724, 2018); J.P. Koning, Fedcoin: A Central Bank-Issued Cryptocurrency, R3 REPORT 15 (2016); 
Sina Motamedi, Will Bitcoins Ever Become Money? A Path to Decentralized Central Banking, 
TANNUTUVA.ORG (July 21, 2014), https://tannutuva.org/2014/will-bitcoins-ever-become-money-a-
path-to-decentralized-central-banking/ [https://perma.cc/4KCY-N2BB]. 
77. Richard Kastelein, Tunisia to Replace Its National Digital Currency, eDinar, With 
Blockchain-Driven Monetas Currency, BLOCKCHAIN NEWS (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.the-
blockchain.com/2015/12/28/tunisia-to-replace-its-national-digital-currency-edinar-with-blockchain-
driven-monetas-currency/ [https://perma.cc/AZC9-R9EH]. 
78. Ryan Browne, Venezuela About to Pre-Sell ‘Petro’ Cryptocurrency, and Other Countries 
Could Follow, CNBC (Feb. 19, 2018), 
 https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/19/venezuela-petro-cryptocurrency-pre-sale-starts-february-
20.html [https://perma.cc/EZ3Q-RFL2]. 
79. Samburaj Das, Senegal Will Introduce a Blockchain-Based National Digital Currency, CCN 
(Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.ccn.com/senegal-will-introduce-blockchain-based-national-digital-
currency [https://perma.cc/Y4QV-TV2B]. 
80. Afraid of a few commercial entities controlling cash supply in Sweden, the Swedish central 
bank has kicked off its digital currency project e-krona. Amanda Billner, Now There are Plans for ‘e-
Krona’ in Cash-Shy Sweden, BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 26, 2018, 2:25 AM CDT), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-26/riksbank-to-develop-pilot-electronic-currency-
amid-cash-decline [https://perma.cc/85SM-VPLG]. 
81. Jon Buck, Dubai Will Issue First Ever State Cryptocurreny, COIN TELEGRAPH (Oct. 1, 2017), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/dubai-will-issue-first-ever-state-cryptocurrency 
[https://perma.cc/J7XN-C77Q].  
82. Arjun Kharpal, Japanese Banks Are Thinking of Making Their Own Cryptocurrency Called 
the J-Coin, CNBC: TECH TRANSFORMERS (Sept. 27, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/27/japanese-banks-cryptocurrency-j-coin.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y8CX-WT75]. 
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Estonia (Estcoin),83 and Ecuador,84 among others.85 These early attempts 
suggest that the countries that are most in need may someday decide to issue 
their own digital- or cryptocurrencies pegged to an existing stable 
cryptocurrency.  
Several factors explain such early experimentation. Central bank-
operated wholesale payment systems are already at the end of their 
technological life cycle, using database designs and computing languages 
that are largely obsolete and very expensive to maintain.86 The shortcomings 
of the existing system have created considerations in which a central bank 
would create a token with one-for-one conversion with cash and reserves. 
Such token designs would allow token minting and destruction if an 
equivalent amount of cash or reserves were created or destroyed.87  
Emerging trends in payment systems and the end of technological life 
cycles necessitate central banks’ enhanced examination with 
cryptocurrency solutions. Central banks in countries with rapidly declining 
cash usage88 are subject to the most pressure to find alternatives to bank 
notes. Given these trends in technology and in light of the shortcomings of 
the existing payment system infrastructure, all central banks will eventually 
need to evaluate if and when issuing central bank sponsored 
cryptocurrencies can create value in their own systems.89  
The private sector is equally engaged in cryptocurrency experimentation. 
Most cryptocurrency exchanges are creating their own stable 
 
 
83. Kaspar Korjus, We’re Planning to Launch Estcoin – and That’s Only the Start, MEDIUM 
(Dec. 18, 2017), https://medium.com/e-residency-blog/were-planning-to-launch-estcoin-and-that-s-
only-the-start-310aba7f3790 [https://perma.cc/2VBP-ATXM]. 
84. Everett Rosenfeld, Ecuador Becomes the First County to Roll Out Its Own Digital Cash, 
CNBC: CURRENCIES (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/06/ecuador-becomes-the-first-
country-to-roll-out-its-own-digital-durrency.html [https://perma.cc/A7A9-M87V]. 
85. Cryptocurrencies by Country, THOMPSON REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/answerson/world-cryptocurrencies-country [https://perma.cc/XQ67-
5PUY]. 
86. Bech & Garratt, supra note 74, at 66. 
87. Id.; Koning, supra note 76; Motamedi, supra note 76. 
88. Jonathan Brugge, Olivier Denecker, Hamza Jawaid, Andras Kovacs, & Ibrahim Shami, 
Attacking the Cost of Cash, MCKINSEY &COMPANY (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/attacking-the-cost-of-cash 
[https://perma.cc/8PB8-ZJ6V]. 
89. Bech & Garratt, supra note 74, at 67; Hileman & Rauchs, supra note 50.  
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cryptocurrencies.90 On February 14, 2019, J.P. Morgan (JPM) introduced 
the first prototype of its blockchain settlement product: JPM Coin, a stable 
cryptocurrency backed one-to-one by JPM’s fiat currency reserves.91 The 
close structure of the JPM coin, namely that JPM only makes it available to 
existing clients, appears to be an anachronism.92 Finally, Facebook is 
developing a stable cryptocurrency in an attempt to break into the financial 
services business.93  The emergence of stable cryptocurrencies that are 
funded by private banking institutions and technology behemoths suggests 
that, in addition to central banks, established banking and technology 
institutions are also realizing the benefits and potential of stable 
cryptocurrencies. 
 
III. STABLE CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
 
Since their inception in 2014 with Tether,94 stable cryptocurrencies have 
primarily been used as a cash equivalent for cryptocurrency portfolios. In 
2019, stable cryptocurrencies have grown substantially in popularity as an 
answer to the high volatility associated with the cryptocurrency markets.95 
Depending on their design, they can offer additional features such as 
 
 
90. Jeff J. Roberts, Cryptocurrency Exchanges Back $32 Million Stable Coin Project, FORTUNE 
(Aug. 29, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/08/29/cryptocurrency-exchanges-back-32-million-stable-
coin-project [https://perma.cc/539Z-7WFQ]; Julie Verhage, Crypto Exchange Coinbase to List Stable 
Coin Backed by Circle, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
10-23/crypto-exchange-coinbase-to-list-stable-coin-backed-by-circle.   
91. Michelle Davis & Alastair Marsh, JPMorgan to Use Digital Coin to Speed Up Corporate 
Payments, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-
14/jpmorgan-to-use-cryptocurrency-for-payments-business-cnbc-says [https://perma.cc/6ACY-
DLZH]. 
92. Brad Garlinghouse (@bgarlinghouse), TWITTER (Feb. 14, 2019, 10:45 AM), 
https://twitter.com/bgarlinghouse/status/1096118363506434048 [https://perma.cc/P5PR-SYAP].  
93. Sarah Frier & Julie Verhage, Facebook is Developing a Cryptocurrency for WhatsApp 
Transfers, Sources Say, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20, 2018, 6:35 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-21/facebook-is-said-to-develop-stablecoin-for-
whatsapp-transfers [https://perma.cc/JG6T-UKBH]; Nathanial Popper & Mike Isaac, Facebook and 
Telegram Are Hoping to Succeed Where Bitcoin Failed, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/technology/cryptocurrency-facebook-telegram.html 
[https://perma.cc/3KH3-TGHX].  
94. Pete Rizzo, Realcoin Rebrands as ‘Tether’ to Avoid Altcoin Association, COINDESK (Nov. 
20, 2014, 12:01 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/realcoin-relaunches-tether-avoid-altcoin-association. 
95. BINANCE ACADEMY, supra note 2 
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transparency, privacy, and increased decentralization.96 Stable 
cryptocurrencies can also offer lower fees and faster transaction speeds, 
“making them quite useful for international transactions and everyday 
payments.”97  
The evolution of stable cryptocurrencies creates a new opportunity to 
reexamine earlier decades of monetary policy-making and scholarship. In 
particular, it allows an expansion and reexamination of the quantity theory 
of money and associated models.98  In 2014, Robert Sams introduced the 
first attempt at creating a stability mechanism for cryptocurrencies.99 
Sams’s early academic attempt was quickly followed by commercial 
applications and expansions of his earlier vision.100 In 2019, the leading 
notable stable cryptocurrency startups and their respective approaches 
include: Ampleforth,101 Paxos Standard Token (PAX),102 Gemini Dollar 
 
 
96. Id. 
97. Id.  
98. The quantity theory of money predicts that money growth should be neutral in the long run 
in its effects on the growth rate of production and should affect the inflation rate on a one-for-one basis. 
In David Hume's pioneering essays of 1752, Of Money and Of Interest, Hume stressed that changes in 
the number of units of money in circulation will have proportional effects on all prices that are stated in 
money terms. In turn, Hume suggests that changes in the number of units of money in circulation have 
no effect on economic output, i.e., on how much people produce or on the goods they produce or 
consume. The quantity theory of money has evolved dramatically since the beginnings of modern 
monetary theory in Hume’s pioneering essay. David Hume, Of Money and of Interest, in WRITINGS ON 
ECONOMICS (Eugene Rotwein ed., 1970). 
99. Robert Sams, A Note on Cryptocurrency Stabilisation: Seigniorage Shares, BRAVE 
NEWCOIN (Apr. 28, 2015), https://assets.ctfassets.net/sdlntm3tthp6/resource-asset-
r390/5a940afb21681d19c0b3b76cf69259e1/58ebe9e2-1f28-4a8d-8ce1-26abef07aedf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/25AM-EVGB] 
100. See, e.g., The Cryptoeconomics of Seigniorage Shares Stablecoins: Basis and Carbon, SMITH 
+ CROWN (May 28, 2018), https://www.smithandcrown.com/cryptoeconomics-seignorage-shares-look-
basis-carbon/ [https://perma.cc/A6EU-DSP4] (Basis’s design and expansion of Sams’ 2014 attempt). 
101. See generally P.H. Madore, Crypto Firm Fragments Launches Stablecoin Following 
‘Ampleforth’ Rebrand, CCN.COM (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/crypto-firm-fragments-
launches-stablecoin-following-ampleforth-rebrand [https://perma.cc/AB3K-BNTR].  
102. See generally Josiah Wilmoth, Paxos Standard: Why the Stablecoin You’ve Never Heard of 
Just Might Take Down Tether, CCN.COM(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/paxos-standard-why-
the-stablecoin-youve-never-heard-of-just-might-take-down-tether [https://perma.cc/DN2C-XX64]. 
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(GUSD),103 TrueUsd (TUSD),104 Circle’s CENTRE consortium (USD-
C),105 Facebook’s Stablecoin launch,106 and, of course, Tether,107 among 
several others.  
Cryptocurrency-backed tokens are even more expensive because the 
stability is achieved via pegs to (currently) much more unstable 
cryptocurrencies. Any cryptocurrency-backed token must be backed with 
much more than one hundred percent of the current value of the 
cryptocurrency in case the total value in the group of other cryptocurrencies’ 
values drops. On the other hand, the uncollateralized schemes include 
(formerly) Basis and NuBits, which follow the quantity theory of money, 
algorithmically minting and burning tokens in order to maintain a peg.108 At 
the time of this writing no uncollateralized algorithmic project had created 
a provable stable mechanism for its tokens.  
 
 
103. Jack Mathis, Gemini’s New USD Cryptocurrency Stablecoin: A Whitepaper Deep Dive, 
CCN.COM NEWS (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/geminis-new-usd-cryptocurrency-stablecoin-a-
whitepaper-deep-dive [https://perma.cc/48NK-7UDS]; see also Jeff Kauflin et al., The Most Innovative 
Fintech Companies in 2019, FORBES.COM (Feb. 4, 2019, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/fintech/2019/#4da63f0f2b4c [https://perma.cc/Y4F7-24KH]. 
104. Tether(USDT) Vs TrueUSD(TUSD): Which Stablecoin is Better?, COINTOPPER (Sept. 5, 
2018), https://cointopper.com/guides/tetherusdt-vs-trueusdtusd-which-stablecoin-is-better 
[https://perma.cc/2WDC-U28D]; see also Bloomberg, Love Crypto but Not Its Volatility? Meet 
Stablecoins, FORTUNE.COM (Jan. 30, 2019), http://fortune.com/2019/01/30/stablecoins-bitcoin-
cryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/3BK3-HW3S]; P.H. Madore, Exclusive: TrueUSD Partners with 
Nexo to Provide Holders with Instant Loans on Cryptocurrency, CCN.COM (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://www.ccn.com/exclusive-trueusd-partners-with-nexo-to-provide-holders-with-instant-loans-on-
cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/RKJ9-TDFA]. 
105. Stablecoin Guide: Why are Stablecoins so Important to Crypto Markets?, CRYPTOGLOBE 
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.cryptoglobe.com/latest/2018/10/stablecoin-guide-why-are-stablecoins-so-
important-to-crypto-markets/ [https://perma.cc/5RV6-62WF]. 
106. Nathaniel Popper & Mike Isaac, Here Comes a Facebook Coin, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2019, 
at B1; see also Linas Kmieliauskas, Facebook is Already Pitching its Stablecoin to Exchanges – Report, 
CRYPTONEWS (Mar. 01, 2019), https://cryptonews.com/news/facebook-is-already-pitching-its-
stablecoin-to-exchanges-rep-3453.htm [https://perma.cc/7YFD-5H7J]. 
107. Nikhilesh De, Tether to Launch New Version of USDT Stablecoin on Tron Blockchain, 
COINDESK (Mar. 4, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/tether-to-launch-new-version-of-usdt-
stablecoin-on-tron-blockchain [https://perma.cc/XET2-PWGH]; see also Carlo C., Tether Brings 
Benefits of P2P Transactions to Fiat Currency Transfers, COINTELEGRAPH (Nov. 22, 2014), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/tether-brings-benefits-of-p2p-transactions-to-fiat-currency-transfers 
[https://perma.cc/EWD8-KTAK]. 
108. Nader Al-Naji, Josh Chen & Lawrence Diao, Basis: A Price-Stable Cryptocurrency with an 
Algorithmic Central Bank, BASIS  9-10 (June 20, 2017), https://www.basis.io/basis_whitepaper_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N6T2-CTK9]; Jordan Lee, Nu, NUBITS.COM (Sept. 23, 2014), 
https://nubits.com/NuWhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y5C-VCZG].  
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A. Growth 
 
The growth of stable cryptocurrencies can largely be traced back to 
attempts to combine the utility and benefits of cryptocurrencies and 
blockchain technology with remedies for the existing fluctuation and 
volatility in the cryptocurrency markets.109 The growth data suggests that 
demand for products that help manage the volatility inherent in other crypto-
assets is likely to continue to increase.110   
 
 
B. Cost Reduction 
 
The total cost of creating and maintaining cryptocurrencies is a fraction 
of the cost associated with printing and maintaining bank notes.111 First and 
foremost, all cost associated with printing and transporting paper notes112 
becomes obsolete with the use of cryptocurrencies. The cost associated with 
 
 
109. BINANCE ACADEMY, supra note 2 
110. Can JPM Coin Disrupt the Existing Stablecoin Market?, BINANCE RESEARCH  4, (Mar. 1, 
2019), https://info.binance.com/en/research/marketresearch/img/BinanceResearch-JPMCoin.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LH8B-PXDV].   
111. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
Ǌ
BaĮed on Ĵhe cķīīenĴ infoīmaĴion pīoŒided bř JơPơ MoīganƢ JPM Coin mighĴ be a diīecĴ compeĴiĴoī ĴoǊ
RippleƢ œhich cķīīenĴlř haĮ a lead in ĴhiĮ indķĮĴīř œiĴh oŒeī ųŲŲ inĮĴiĴķĴional clienĴĮ  foī iĴĮǊŵ
blockchainƶpoœeīed alĴeīnaĴiŒe Ĵo SWIFT ơǊǊŶ
Ǌ
FiaĴƶcollaĴeīališed ĮĴablecoinĮ haŒe pīimaīilř Ĵhe folloœing feaĴķīeĮƣǊ
ƶ SeīŒing aĮ fiaĴ onƮoff īamĨĮƣ ​foī inĮĴiĴķĴional inŒeĮĴoīĮƢ Ĵheř collaĴeīališe Ĵheiī USD aĮĮeĴĮ ĴoǊ
ĮĴablecoinĮ befoīe ĴīanĮfeīīing on a œide ŒaīieĴř of eŘchangeĮơǊǊ
ƶ SĴable ĨīiceĮƣ​ oœing Ĵo Ĵhe pegging ĮřĮĴemƢ iĴ iĮ conŒenienĴ Ĵo Ĵīade ĮĴablecoinĮ œiĴh oĴheīǊ
digiĴal aĮĮeĴĮơ FiaĴƶbacked ĮĴablecoinĮ aīe eĮpeciallř popķlaī in OTC ĴīadingơǊ
ƶ EaĮř Ĵo aĨĨīehendƣ ​ķnlike algoīiĴh ic ĮĴablecoinĮƢ inŒeĮĴoīĮ haŒe moīe confidence in ĴheǊ
fiaĴƶbaĮed pegging mechaniĮm aĮ iĴ iĮ moīe inĴķiĴiŒe Ĵo appīehendơ The bīeak in Ĵhe peg ofǊ
Įome algoīiĴhmic ĮĴablecoinĮ haĮ made iĴ difficķlĴ foī inĮĴiĴķĴional inŒeĮĴoīĮ Ĵo conĮideī ĴheĮeǊ
aĮĮeĴĮ aĮ loœƶīiĮk aĮ fiaĴƶpegged ĮĴablecoinĮơǊ
EŒeīƶincīeaĮing Volķmeƣ ConĴīibķĴion of SĴablecoin Volķme Ĵo ToĴal IndķĮĴīřǊ
VolķmeǊ
Ǌ
Ǌ
Ǌ
The ĴoĴal Įhaīe of ĮĴablecoin Œolķme conĴinķeĮ Ĵo incīeaĮe īelaĴiŒe Ĵo ĴoĴal Œolķme acīoĮĮ Ĵhe enĴiīeǊ
cīřpĴoaĮĮeĴ maīkeĴƢ œhich īeflecĴĮ incīeaĮing demand Ĵo manage ŒolaĴiliĴř inheīenĴ in oĴheīǊ
cīřpĴoaĮĮeĴĮơǊ
Ǌ
ŴơǊ SĴablecoin MaīkeĴ SĴīķcĴķīeǊǊ
Ǌ
ŵ ​hĴĴpĮƣƮƮœœœơcnbcơcomƮŴŲųŹƮųŲƮųŲƮīippleƶhaĮƶoŒeīƶųŲŲƶclienĴĮƶaĮƶmainĮĴīeamƶfinanceƶœaīmĮƶĴoƶblockchainơhĴmlǊ
Ŷ ​hĴĴpĮƣƮƮœœœơinŒeĮĴopediaơcomƮaīĴicleĮƮpeīĮonalƶfinanceƮŲŷŲŷųŷƮhoœƶĮœifĴƶĮřĮĴemƶœoīkĮơaĮpǊǊ
Ǌ
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fiat bank note counterfeit response113 is also unnecessary for 
cryptocurrencies because the technology makes counterfeit attacks nearly 
impossible. Moreover, all fees associated with money transmission services, 
such as ATM fees and other intermediator fees114 associated with fiat bank 
notes are reduced. 
Cost reductions associated with stable cryptocurrencies can be quite 
substantial in the banking, money transfer, underwriting, trading, and 
investment management contexts. Given the enhanced transparency and 
auditability of transactions on the blockchain, transactions between 
institutional banking clients can be executed without the need for trust 
stemming from a pre-existing relationship. According to some estimates, 
significant cost savings are possible in the context of reporting, know-your-
customer and client onboarding, business operations, and overall 
compliance cost.115  
Stable cryptocurrencies can help lower the cost of trading in the 
cryptocurrency market. The existing cryptocurrency market forces the 
investing public to convert from diverse cryptocurrencies traded in different 
jurisdictions into other cryptocurrencies in a diverse jurisdiction or on 
diverse exchanges that may actually trade a currency pair that is needed by 
the given investor in a given case. Consumers pay a price every time they 
convert in and out of a currency. The use of stable cryptocurrencies, if traded 
in pairs, with another currency, with the cryptocurrency in question, allows 
investors to remove several levels of conversion fees and removes the risk 
of depreciation of the bridge currency—the currency temporarily used for 
an investment for purposes of conversion—during the trades.  
 
 
113. See supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text. 
114. See infra note 123. 
115. Banking on Blockchain, ACCENTURE,  
https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/Accenture/Conversion-
Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Consulting/Accenture-Banking-on-Blockchain.pdf#zoom=50 
[https://perma.cc/YP9P-V6QF]. Finance-reporting costs could be lowered by seventy percent as a result 
of optimized data quality, transparency, and internal processes enabled by a shared and verified database: 
the blockchain. Supporting functions of centralized operations (e.g., KYC, client-onboarding) could 
bring fifty percent savings by establishing more efficient processes for managing digital identities and 
by “mutualizing” or sharing client data on a blockchain across multiple financial institutions. Business 
operations expenses from, for instance, middle office, clearing, and settlement activities could be 
lowered by up to fifty percent by reducing or eliminating the need for third-party reconciliation, 
confirmation, and validation of trades. Compliance costs could be reduced by thirty to fifty percent, 
owing to higher transparency and easiness to audit financial transactions. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/15
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The perverse cost and fee structure in the existing cryptocurrency market 
and stable cryptocurrencies’ ability to overcome those downsides can best 
be illustrated with a representative hypothetical. Imagine a cryptocurrency 
project that claims to be the Amazon of the crypto world, offering the public 
the ability to buy tangible goods in exchange for cryptocurrencies. In order 
to buy or sell its tokens, investors are forced to open an account on the 
Indodax trades the tokens in pairs against ETH or BTC, among other 
currencies. If an investor wishes to sell her entire holdings of the tokens, 
Indodax only allows withdrawals of one BTC every twenty-four hours from 
its exchange.116 The investor now sells the tokens for BTC (representing the 
first conversion and associated fee required), then transfers the BTC to their 
BTC wallet with, for example, Coinbase (requiring a second conversion and 
fee), and lastly sells the BTC via Coinbase for conversion into U.S. dollars 
(requiring yet another conversion and fee). Had the investor used a well-
established stable cryptocurrency that is traded on an exchange with deep 
liquidity in pairs with the token, the investor would have avoided two of the 
three conversion fees. In addition, the investor is no longer subject to the 
downward risk of BTC itself after conversion.  
The true power of a well-established stable cryptocurrency can best 
unfold in combination with an evolving universal exchange that provides 
deep liquidity. Cost savings enabled by stable cryptocurrencies that remove 
the need for conversions can only truly be facilitated by a deeply liquid 
market facilitated by a universal exchange, which bridges the traditional 
assets and crypto assets for all investors. The national Swiss exchange,117 as 
well as several private projects,118 are working on exchange projects that 
attempt to accomplish this universality. In the above hypothetical, not only 
would the need to move assets from one illiquid exchange to another (with 
the associated fees) be obviated, but market participants could also simply 
park their assets by converting into a well-established stable 
 
 
116. What is the Minimum and Maximum Amount of Bitcoin That I Can Withdraw in a Day?, 
INDODOX.COM,  https://help.indodax.com/id_ID/berapa-jumlah-minimal-dan-maksimal-bitcoin-yang-
dapat-saya-tarik-dalam-sehari/ [https://perma.cc/Q9X5-V5EX] (last visited July 2, 2019) (translated via 
Google Translate). 
117. Jimmy Aki, Switzerland’s National Exchange is Listing an XRP Investment Product, 
CCN.COM, (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.ccn.com/switzerland-national-exchange-xrp-etp 
[https://perma.cc/BQ2D-PDUX].  
118. See SHINGO LAVINE, DEMOCRATIZING CRYTPOCURRENCY (2d ed. 2017), 
https://www.ethos.io/Ethos_Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GHH-KAWB]. 
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cryptocurrency.119 This would create more certainty and trust in the market 
which, in turn, would increase market liquidity. In essence, the combination 
of a well-established stable cryptocurrency with a universal exchange 
creates a positive feedback loop. The exchange liquidity is enhanced by the 
stable cryptocurrency and the stability and adoption of the stable 
cryptocurrency is enhanced through the exchange.  
 
C. Equity 
 
Using cash in an economy has a disproportionate impact on the poor and 
unbanked.120 In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation estimates that 6.5% of U.S. households are unbanked and 
18.7% of U.S. households are underbanked.121  These estimates are even 
higher in the developing world.122 Using cash for consumption imposes a 
regressive tax—with the highest impact on the unbanked. Fees associated 
with gaining access to cash are around four times higher than fees associated 
with using bank accounts for transactions.123 These effects on the poor get 
exacerbated in economies that are mostly cash-based. Whereas in the United 
States only about one third of all transactions in the economy are conducted 
using cash payments, in countries like India, Mexico, and Egypt, nearly 
every transaction is conducted in cash.124   
Stable cryptocurrencies can help support equality. The disproportionate 
effects of cash economies on the poor and the unbanked can be remedied 
with stable cryptocurrencies. Access to cryptocurrency transactions is 
 
 
119. In essence, a well-established stable cryptocurrency may serve the same function as bitcoin 
in crypto-assets and the U.S. dollar in traditional assets with the additional benefit of avoiding exchange 
rate risk exposure. Id. 
120. Rogoff, supra note 52, at 48. 
121. 2017 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, FEDERAL DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE CORPORATION (2018), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/ [https://perma.cc/G8BU-
FS5K].  
122. Compare the United States with Mexico, Egypt and India. See Chakravorti, supra note 18. 
123. Examples of fees associated with cash transactions are ATM fees, payday lending, cashing 
check fees, buy-here-pay-here auto loans, among others. “The unbanked have a five times higher risk of 
paying cash access fees on payroll and EBT cards. Poorer consumers have to spend far more time getting 
cash. On average, Americans spend twenty-eight minutes a month travelling to get cash, but that time 
isn’t evenly distributed. People who don’t use a bank spend about five minutes longer getting to the 
place where they can get cash, and unemployed people spent nearly nine minutes more.” Id. 
124. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/15
 
 
 
 
CALCATERRA ET AL. ARTICLE 
3/31/2020 
 
2020]                               Stable Cryptocurrencies                                   215 
 
possible without a banking relationship. With equality of payment system 
access, the poor and unbanked would no longer be disadvantaged through 
the use of cash.125  
Reliance on cash in developing economies results in lost tax revenues for 
the government because of the associated underreporting of earnings and 
transactions. With fully traceable cryptocurrencies that are fully transparent, 
those tax revenues will not get lost.126  
 
D. Counteracting Corruption 
 
The use of cryptocurrencies in commerce decreases the likelihood of 
corruption in its many forms such as governmental, economic, and 
corporate.  The aforementioned negative economic effects of corruption127 
that often are associated with the lack of traceability of bank notes can 
largely be eradicated with the use of cryptocurrencies. Corruption in the 
economies of many countries largely maintains the status quo, undermines 
economic growth,128 and makes participation of the entire population of a 
given country in its gross domestic product and value-chain appreciation 
less likely.  
 
 
125. It is of course debatable if this gain for the poor and unbanked that is associated with equal 
payment system access is offset by the inability to evade taxes that comes with the enhanced 
accountability of cryptocurrencies. This problem represents a “cash paradox: while cash may be 
considered the poor man’s best friend, it also places a disproportionate burden on the poor.” Id. 
126. The tensions and tradeoffs between transparency opportunities and privacy concerns in 
cryptocurrencies has been recognized in the literature. See, e.g., Susan Athey, Christian Catalini & 
Catherine Tucker, The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small Money, Small  Costs,  Small  Talk (Stanford 
University Graduate School of Business, Working Paper, No 17-032, 2017), 
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/17-032.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3XX-8Y5S]; 
Bech & Garratt, supra note 74, at 65.   
 Privacy and freedom from government interference are sometimes presented as two of the big 
advantages of a cryptocurrency. However, privacy is a feature that government or central bank-
sponsored cryptocurrency may foster less than transparency. It will be left to the designers of such 
cryptocurrencies to determine which parts of the currency will follow transparency metrics and which 
need to discount transparency to protect privacy. Making those determinations necessitates decentralized 
governance mechanisms. See CRAIG CALCATERRA, ON-CHAIN GOVERNANCE OF DECENTRALIZED 
AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS: BLOCKCHAIN ORGANIZATION USING SEMADA, (May 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3188374 [https://perma.cc/H732-68RG]. Ultimately, market acceptance of 
government sponsored stable cryptocurrencies will determine the most efficient tradeoffs between 
accountability and privacy.  
127. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.  
128. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text. 
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The transparency and traceability of public blockchain transactions in 
business and commerce counteract corruption. Using public blockchains in 
commerce makes each and every transaction publicly visible and traceable 
for consumers and the government alike. The transparency and traceability 
make it significantly more difficult for corrupt public officials to siphon off 
value by accepting bribes, thereby increasing the overall cost of doing 
business in such countries.129  
 
E. Transforming the Cryptocurrency Market Structure 
 
The market structure for cryptocurrencies is subject to multiple 
convolutions and inefficiencies that undermine mass adoption. The market 
structure of cryptocurrencies from their inception to 2019 is comparable to 
mandating customers who wish to purchase groceries to purchase a different 
currency for each store they visit and for each product chosen.  
The market for cryptocurrencies is very volatile and illiquid and lacks the 
investing infrastructure that is needed. It is very difficult for investors to 
borrow cryptocurrencies in the market. Leverage in the cryptocurrency 
market exacerbates the liquidity and volatility problems. Moreover, 
leverage may particularly benefit speculators at the expense of the overall 
trading public. Such speculators driving up the prices can deepen the 
liquidity problem. \This exacerbates the problem of illiquidity as borrowed 
money is driving the price. Options on cryptocurrencies add another layer 
of cost and also exacerbate the illiquidity problem.  
Speculators know better than investors what generates supply and 
demand in cryptocurrency markets. The very high illiquidity of the 
cryptocurrency market in combination with the herd mentality of crypto-
investors benefits speculators because it allows scarcity to appear out of 
nowhere including for investors who are about to make an investment 
decision.  
Stable cryptocurrencies help transform the cryptocurrency market 
structure. Stable cryptocurrencies are a necessary first step to address the 
shortcomings of the existing market structure for cryptocurrencies. Stable 
cryptocurrencies create a cash equivalent for the cryptocurrency market. As 
 
 
129. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.  
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such, they function as a proxy for conversion to fiat currencies or as a cash 
component of investment portfolios.  
Stable cryptocurrencies have knock-on effects on consumer confidence. 
Stable cryptocurrencies transform the cryptocurrency market by 
experimenting with stability designs. The experimentation and its effect on 
consumer and market confidence may follow similar patterns as emerging 
market currencies. Emerging market currencies were initially pegged to the 
U.S. dollar, and policy makers would allow them to free float in the market 
to evaluate the stability of the currency.130 If and when the currency moved 
outside of a predetermined price stability range (or band), the currency 
would be repegged against the dollar until more confidence in the market 
enabled price stability.131   
 
F. Fighting Inflation 
 
Stable cryptocurrencies’ ability to address inflation is evolving. Countries 
with high inflation and year-to-date currency devaluation,132 have started to 
evaluate cryptocurrency alternatives to offset some of the effects of 
currency devaluation in their economies.133 Most early cryptocurrency 
attempts in 2015 to 2018 used designs that relied on limiting supply of 
tokens, like capping and hardcoding the total number of tokens available in 
a given ecosystem, as policy tools to fight inflation.134 Since 2017, a slowly 
increasing number of token designs is entering the market with designs that 
allow the minting of additional tokens.  
Several factors help explain the emergence of minting token designs. In 
fact, fixing token supply removes the core policy tool—minting of 
additional tokens to increase supply—intended to address overvaluation, 
speculation, market frenzy and irrational exuberance.  
 
 
 
130. Shaghil Ahmed, Brahima Coulibaly & Andrei Zlate, International Financial Spillovers to 
Emerging Market Economies: How Important are Economic Fundamentals?, 76 J.  INT’L MONEY AND 
FIN. 133, 140 (2017).  
131.  Id.  
132. See, for example, Venezuela (2018: -99%), Argentina (2018: -51.85%), Turkey (2018: -
35%), and Brazil (2018: -20.6%). See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.  
133. Id.  
134. Wulf Kaal, Crypto Economics—The Top 100 Token Models Compared, BANKING & FIN. 
SER. POL. REP.  (2018) at 22, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 [https://perma.cc/9PYE-JJP6].  
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G. Price Stability 
 
The economics literature has examined central banks’ ability to maintain 
currency price stability over the long and short term.135 The majority of 
economic authors emphasize the core role central banking plays in the 
betterment of society,136 A large part of the literature discusses the limitation 
of central bank-controlled monetary policy.137 The core critique of central 
banks’ monetary policy revolves around the elusive goal of currency 
stability under the control of central banks.138  Central banks are constantly 
 
 
135. F.A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: THE ARGUMENT REFINED 20 (3d ed. 1990); 
See also DON PATINKIN, MONEY, INTEREST, AND PRICES (2d. ed. Harper & Row 1965). Contra Milton 
Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1968). “If liquidity preference is 
absolute or nearly so-as Keynes believed likely in times of heavy unemployment-interest rates cannot 
be lowered by monetary measures. If investment and consumption are little affected by interest rates-as 
Hansen and many of Keynes' other American disciples came to believe-lower interest rates, even if they 
could be achieved, would do little good. Monetary policy is twice damned. The contraction, set in train, 
on this view, by a collapse of investment or by a shortage of investment opportunities or by stubborn 
thriftiness, could not, it was argued, have been stopped by monetary measures. But there was available 
an alternative-fiscal policy. Government spending could make up for insufficient private investment. 
Tax reductions could undermine stubborn thriftiness. The wide acceptance of these views in the 
economics profession meant that for some two decades monetary policy was believed by all but a few 
reactionary souls to have been rendered obsolete by new economic knowledge. Money did not matter. 
Its only role was the minor one of keeping interest rates low, in order to hold down interest payments in 
the government budget, contribute to the "euthanasia of the rentier," and maybe, stimulate investment a 
bit to assist government spending in maintaining a high level of aggregate demand. ” Id. See also JOHN 
STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1929). “There cannot be intrinsically a more 
insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than money; except in the character of a contrivance for 
sparing time and labour. It is a machine for doing quickly and commodiously, what would be done, 
though less quickly and commodiously, without it: and like many other kinds of machinery, it only exerts 
a distinct and independent influence of its own when it gets out of order.” Id. at 296. 
136. JOHN M KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY (1930).  The economic turmoil of the 1930s shifted 
attention away from problems of monetary neutrality and lead to a focus on monetary policy for short-
term economic stimulus. Id.  See also JOHN M KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST, AND MONEY. (1936); JAN TINBERGEN, BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (1939).   
137. Friedman, supra note 135, at 11. “The link between the policy actions of the monetary 
authority and the price level, while unquestionably present, is more indirect than the link between the 
policy actions of the authority and any of the several monetary totals. Moreover, monetary action takes 
a longer time to affect the price level than to affect the monetary totals and both the time lag and the 
magnitude of effect vary with circumstances. As a result, we cannot predict at all accurately just what 
effect a particular monetary action will have on the price level and, equally important, just when it will 
have that effect. Attempting to control directly the price level is therefore likely to make monetary policy 
itself a source of economic disturbance because of false stops and starts.” Id. at 15. 
138. Robert Skidelsky, Why Reinvent the Monetary Wheel, PROJECT SYNDICATE (May 23, 2018), 
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being lobbied to increase or decrease money supply away from 
equilibrium.139 Moreover, even without lobbying, central banks are subject 
to information asymmetries that do not allow them to determine the optimal 
amount of supply at any given point in time.140 
Stable cryptocurrencies are not subject to those limitations to the same 
degree. By making rationales and outcomes hardcoded as part of their 
policies stable cryptocurrencies limit the amount of lobbying that can affect 
policy decisions. Cryptocurrencies enable optimized balancing of the 
transparency factors associated with monetary policy. Because of this 
transparency and associated predictability, market participants can 
anticipate policy making and adjust behavior accordingly. In fact, such 
anticipatory policy reactions could, over time, make actual policy-making 
the exception rather than the rule.  
The protocols underlying stable cryptocurrencies enable unprecedented 
tools for monetary policy-making.141 No stable cryptocurrency can 
 
 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cryptocurrencies-false-promise-by-robert-skidelsky-
2018-05?barrier=accesspaylog [https://perma.cc/3PJG-L2SJ]; Richard M. Ebeling, The Myth that 
Central Banks Assure Economic Stability, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (June 8, 2018), 
https://fee.org/articles/the-myth-that-central-banks-assure-economic-stability/ [https://perma.cc/ZR7G-
MC28]; Hayek, supra note 135, at 91; Friedman, supra note 135.  “I have selected two limitations of 
monetary policy to discuss: (1) It cannot peg interest rates for more than very limited periods; (2) It 
cannot peg the rate of unemployment for more than very limited periods. [Yet,] The first and most 
important lesson that history teaches about what monetary policy can do-and it is a lesson of the most 
profound importance is that monetary policy can prevent money itself from being a major source of 
economic disturbance . . .  A second thing monetary policy can do is provide a stable background for 
the economy-keep the machine well oiled.” Id.at 5-13. 
139. Kevin Dowd, Against Helicopter Money, CATO INST. (Winter 2018), 
https://www.cato.org/cato-journal/winter-2018/against-helicopter-money [https://perma.cc/6BSW-
CFSN]. 
140. John J. Merrick, Jr. & Anthony Saunders, Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy, 17 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 691. 706 (1985). The lack of transparency in centralized monetary policy 
making for fiat currencies also serves legitimate policy interests. For example, a healthy level of market 
speculation over and examination of interest rate decisions by Federal Reserve Banks can help make 
markets more efficient and stable. Richard Dennis & John C. Williams, Monetary Policy, Transparency, 
and Credibility: Conference Summary, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. (2007), 
https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2007/may/monetary-policy-
transparency-credibility-conference-summary/ [https://perma.cc/ZL9D-3GXL].  
141. For instance, in the central banking comparison, if a central bank were to issue its own 
cryptocurrency it could help the central bank solve the zero lower bound problem. See generally Michael 
Bordo & Andrew Levin, Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy, 
VOXEU.ORG (Sept. 23, 2017), https://voxeu.org/article/benefits-central-bank-digital-currency 
[https://perma.cc/M5D9-VC7N].  
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hardcode all required policies and policy-making actions with full 
transparency, as future policy cannot be fully anticipated before the needs 
occur. However, in addition to hardcoded and fully transparent policy 
guidelines, monetary policy for cryptocurrencies can be supported by 
protocols enabling decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs).142  
The transparency afforded by cryptocurrencies may, over time, enable 
feedback effects between decentralized and centralized policy making. As 
stable cryptocurrencies evolve, it is conceivable that policy makers in 
centralized institutions will consider trends and announcements of 
cryptocurrencies for their own policy-making.143 Such feedback effects 
enable dynamic regulatory structures144 that help facilitate innovation,145 
market efficiency, and capital allocation.   
Several countervailing arguments reduce the long-term impact of stable 
cryptocurrencies’ policy-making. Stable cryptocurrencies are not subject to 
the same real-world complexities and political positioning as central banks. 
This allows them to experiment with monetary policy tools on an 
unprecedented scale. If and when real-world market factors pertain to such 
stable cryptocurrencies, such experimentation is limited.  
 
 
142. DAOs do not suffer from comparable democratic legitimacy concerns as centralized policy 
making is equally dominated by unelected officials. Yet, a core argument against DAO monetary policy 
making is associated with the lack of expertise and perverse incentives of DAO members. In many 
existing DAOs, such governance and incentive design concerns are not fully addressed. Other authors 
have already provided a governance and incentive optimization framework for DAOs. Craig Calcaterra, 
On-Chain Governance of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: Blockchain Organization Using 
Semada, (May 24, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3188374 [https://perma.cc/H732-68RG].  
143. Central banks are already experimenting with cryptocurrencies. Jordan Daniell, Central 
Banks On Cryptocurrency, ETHNEWS (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.ethnews.com/central-banks-on-
cryptocurrency[https://perma.cc/YE74-5V2V ]; see also supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.  
144. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry, 48 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 791, 791–828 (2013); Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law: Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional 
Economics Framework (University of St. Thomas – Minnesota School of Law, Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 13-17) (forthcoming 2013), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 
[https://perma.cc/FUN9-QZ2P]. 
145. Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation- From Facts 
to Data, 57 JURIMETRICS J. L., SCI. & TECH. 169 (2017).  
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H. Interoperability 
 
The existing market structure for cryptocurrencies is dominated by 
project competition, data silos, and a significant lack of technological 
interoperability.  
The lack of interoperability is a very serious threat to the survival to 
cryptocurrency projects. As the so-called “crypto winter” of 2018 and 2019 
has demonstrated, the thousands of projects that dominated the market in 
2017 and 2018 often competed and the lack of serious attempts at 
interoperability of projects undermined their survival.146 While some 
commendable projects hope to address the lack of interoperability in the 
industry,147 the progress on interoperability is still insufficient.  
Stable cryptocurrencies provide a common denominator that can increase 
interoperability. Consumers expect one currency they can trust and use for 
many purposes. Consumers do not care how interaction with other 
technologies and disparate blockchains is facilitated.  
 
I. Enabling Global Decentralized Commerce 
 
Several factors limit the evolution of a distributed app economy and 
decentralized commerce. The low transaction throughputs of public 
blockchains148 is a core limitation that holds back more advanced DApps. 
 
 
146. Paul Wilson, The Interoperability Problem of Blockchain May Soon Be Over, GLOBAL COIN 
REPORT (Apr. 10, 2019), https://globalcoinreport.com/the-interoperability-problem-of-blockchain-may-
soon-be-over/ [https://perma.cc/P9V6-ZULY]; Daniel Jeffries, Surviving Crypto Winter – Part one: 
Mattereum and the Internet of Agreements, HACKERNOON (Jan. 1, 2019), 
https://hackernoon.com/surviving-crypto-winter-part-one-mattereum-and-the-internet-of-agreements-
19c99453060 [https://perma.cc/3PF7-9X7Q].  
147. See POLKADOT, https://polkadot.network/ [https://perma.cc/4RWQ-KDET]; TEZOS, 
https://tezos.com/ [https://perma.cc/DP3W-KYRL].  
148. One of the leading projects on the transaction throughput front, EOS, was reportedly capable 
of processing up to 4000 transactions per second in January 2019. EOS vs Ethereum vs TRON, 
DAILYCRYPTOTIMEs (Apr. 21, 2019), https://dailycryptotimes.com/2019/04/eos-vs-ethereum-vs-tron/ 
[https://perma.cc/SPS8-KA7L].   
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Moreover, without a core use case, other than the storage of value, 
decentralization technology is less likely to proliferate. Banking and money 
transmission-related services and triple entry accounting via blockchain 
technology are natural use cases but they fall short in their application as 
the universal use cases for public blockchains. It will be very difficult to 
educate the public sufficiently to seamlessly adopt decentralized protocols 
into daily life if users have to discern and manage public and private keys 
to wallets, among other concerns.   
The existing limitations for decentralized commerce can be overcome. 
Emerging technological improvements, such as the evolution of 5G wireless 
communications technology,149 enable overall higher levels of applications 
of big data solutions150 and higher transaction throughput in decentralized 
systems. Even without the availability of 5G technology, the rapid advances 
of AI in combination with big data and machine learning have already 
affected many of the sectors of the economy.151 The combined effect of AI, 
big data, sensors, and blockchain technology152 foreshadows a market 
expansion for DApps.  
The adoption, acceleration, and evolution of decentralized commerce 
depends, in part, on the functioning and stability of cryptocurrencies. Stable 
cryptocurrencies that allow for smart contracting can be expected to create 
widespread usage in cryptoasset trading, payments for products and services 
in decentralized applications, commerce across industries, and as a treasury 
currency for decentralized projects. Because of their disciplining and market 
stability-enhancing effects, stable cryptocurrencies are part of the financial 
 
 
149. Tadilo Endeshaw Bogale & Long Bao Le, Massive MIMO and mmWave for 5G Wireless 
HetNet: Potential Benefits and Challenges, IEEE VEHICULAR TECH. MAG. (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7397887 [https://perma.cc/WDC7-8T47].  
150. Kristiina Valtanen, Jere Backman, & Seppo Yrjola, Blockchain-Powered Value Creation in 
the 5G and Smart Grid Use Cases, 7 IEEE ACCESS 25690 (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8648405 [https://perma.cc/J7VA-VMA3]. 
151. ERNST & YOUNG, DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION FOR 2020 AND BEYOND: A GLOBAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS STUDY (2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-digital-
transformation-for-2020-and-beyond/$FILE/ey-digital-transformation-for-2020-and-beyond.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K2E7-YM8N]. (suggesting that seventy-nine percent of executives in the study claim 
that technological progress creates an unprecedented paradigm shift). See ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & 
ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF 
BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 205–28 (2014); Townsend, supra note 62. See Canton, supra note 62; Waral, 
Rana & Handrahan, supra note 62; Merrett, supra note 62. 
152. See Fenwick & Vermeulen, supra note 64. 
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technology infrastructure that will form the backbone of any emergence of 
the distributed app economy and decentralized commerce. In turn, 
decentralized commerce has knock-on effects for the evolution of stable 
cryptocurrencies.   
 
J. Market Stability 
 
Abundant evidence exists regarding the high volatility of cryptocurrency 
markets.153 Several factors contribute to the existing volatility in 
cryptocurrency markets.  
The use of cryptocurrencies increases the efficiency of capital allocation 
and overall functioning of markets. Centralized marketplace leaders often 
act as rent-seeking intermediaries that create numerous inefficiencies in the 
market, in addition to the aforementioned transaction cost. Cryptocurrencies 
allow for the partial removal of such intermediation154 and, thus, can help 
increase the efficiency of capital allocation and overall functioning of 
markets. 
Existing stable cryptocurrency designs are already creating market 
stability. The rise of an early stable cryptocurrency design, Tether, in terms 
of its total market capitalization,155 its stability around a one-dollar value, 
and investors’ uses of Tether as a temporary safe haven, provide some 
support for stable cryptocurrencies’ ability to create market stability.   
As the cryptocurrency market matures, stable cryptocurrencies serve a 
similar function for cryptocurrency market stability as emerging market 
currencies did for emerging markets. Unlike emerging market currencies, 
stable cryptocurrencies may not be subject to the independent currency 
trilemma of emerging markets, or some derivation thereof for 
cryptocurrency markets. The currency trilemma of emerging markets 
postulates tradeoffs between different currency objectives. In essence, the 
 
 
153. JT Hamrick, et al., The Economics of Cryptocurrency Pump and Dump Schemes (December 
18, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3303365 [https://perma.cc/9S7U-Q5QJ].  
154. Yet, at the same time, cryptocurrencies and decentralized systems create new intermediators. 
Christian Cataline & Joshua S. Gans, Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain, MIT SLOAN RESEARCH 
PAPER NO. 5191-16 (Apr. 20, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2874598 [https://perma.cc/Y6TP-
78ME].  
155. Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations, COINMARKETCAP (2019), 
https://coinmarketcap.com/ [https://perma.cc/W8VG-A7DW]. 
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trilemma suggests that no currency can attain all three core objectives: (1) 
fixed foreign exchange rate, (2) free capital movement (i.e., the absence of 
capital controls), and (3) an independent monetary policy.156  The lack of 
real-world pressures that afflict emerging market currencies may enable 
stable cryptocurrency projects to experiment with solutions that can help 
overcome the trilemma. The idea of a fully independent monetary policy in 
decentralized currencies, especially, may be attainable for stable 
cryptocurrencies because they can use a combination of hardcoded protocol 
elements and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAO) as monetary 
policy making bodies. The prospect of fully decentralized and independent 
monetary policy for stable cryptocurrencies hinges on DAO governance 
protocols.157  Free capital movement is nearly guaranteed because capital 
controls are nearly impossible to enforce in the case of decentralized 
 
 
156. Atish R. Ghosh, Jonathan David Ostry & Mahvash Saeed Qureshi, Exchange Rate 
Management and Crisis Susceptibility: A Reassessment, 14 Int’l Monetary Fund Working Papers 238–
276 (IMF Working Papers WP/14/11, 2014); Michael Klein & Jay Shambaugh, Rounding the Corners 
of the Policy Trilemma: Sources of Monetary Policy Autonomy, 7 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 33 
(2015); Maurice Obstfeld, Trilemmas and Trade-Offs: Living with Financial Globalisation (BIS 
Working Papers No. 480, 2015); Geert Bekaert & Arnaud Mehl, On the Global Financial Market 
Integration “Swoosh” and the Trilemma, 94 J.  INT’L MONEY & FIN.  227 (2019); Valentina Bruno & 
Hyun Song Shin, Capital Flows and the Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy, 71 J. MONETARY 
ECON.119 (2015); Carlos Caceres, Yan Carriere-Swallow & Bertrand Gruss, Global Financial 
Conditions and Monetary Policy Autonomy (IMF Working Papers WP/16/108, 2016); Maurice Obstfeld, 
Jonathan Ostry & Mahvash Qureshi, A Tie That Binds: Revisiting the Trilemma in Emerging Market 
Economies(IMF Working Papers WP/17/130, 2017); Jonathan D. Ostry, Atish R. Ghosh, Marcos 
Chamon & Mahvash S. Qureshi, Capital Controls: When and Why?, 59 IMF ECON. REV. 562 (2011); 
Evgenia Passari & Hélène Rey, Financial Flows and the International Monetary System, 125 ECON. 
J.675 (2015); Symposium, Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy 
Independence, PROCEEDINGS FED. RESERVE BANK KANSAS CITY (2015); Hélène Rey, International 
Channels of Transmission of Monetary Policy and the Mundellian Trilemma, 64 IMF ECON. REV. 6–35 
(2016). 
157. DAO governance for monetary policy making depends on a governance design that attains 
full decentralization and with it full independence. The Semada Research Institute has created an early 
design that accomplishes those goals. Calcaterra, supra at 142; Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, & Vlad 
Andrei, Semada Technical Whitepaper - Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific 
Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and Anonymous Systems, (University of St. Thomas - 
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-11, 2018),  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 
[https://perma.cc/F93H-K3HY]; Craig Calcaterra & Wulf A. Kaal, Semada’s Proof of Stake Protocol 
(University of St. Thomas - Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-10, 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 [https://perma.cc/F97F-2F4W].  
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currencies.158 Given the ability to use a fully independent monetary policy 
tool, stable cryptocurrencies’ ability to overcome the trilemma may hinge 
on their ability to create a fixed foreign exchange rate. The example of 
Tether demonstrates that price stability is attainable despite a lack of 
independence from the U.S. dollar.  
 
K. Supporting Mass Adoption 
 
The existing cryptocurrency market structure undermines mass adoption 
of cryptocurrencies. The existing cryptocurrency market structure consists 
of multiple different and highly volatile tokens for disparate projects and 
use cases.159 Moreover, project silos and significant lack of interoperability 
of cryptocurrencies and associated projects is a very serious threat to the 
survivability of cryptocurrency projects.160  The average user is unwilling 
to identify, research, and purchase a diverse sets of tokens, even if their 
application and use cases would create value. The existing market structure 
for cryptocurrencies is simply too cumbersome for the average user.161 
Consumers expect one currency they can trust and use for many purposes.   
Stable cryptocurrencies facilitate the adoption of cryptocurrencies by the 
general public and their proliferation. The general public will not use 
cryptocurrencies if a public perception of risk exists that suggests that 
consumers’ value may halve or double at the time of any given transaction 
or purchase. The proliferation of stable cryptocurrencies can help correct 
that consumer perception over time.  
Stable cryptocurrencies help adapt the cryptocurrency market structure to 
support mass adoption of decentralized technology. Consumers’ 
experimentation with and increasing belief in the stability provided by 
cryptocurrencies can help form the foundation for adoption and evolution 
of decentralized technologies. Once that foundation is formed—which 
 
 
158.LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AROUND THE WORLD 106-
08 (June 2018); Laney Zhang, Regulation of Cryptocurrency: China, L. LIBR. CONG., (June 2018), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/china.php [https://perma.cc/N3Y8-UZLB].  
159. See, e.g., supra notes 77-85 
160. See supra Section IV.B.  
161. The existing cryptocurrency structure can be compared with requiring consumers to research, 
understand, and purchase different currencies in centralized systems to make basic economic decisions 
on consumption. See supra Section IV.B. 
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could take decades, depending on the economy and jurisdiction—
consumers will increasingly convert and apply stable cryptocurrencies into 
other tokens for products and services in the evolving decentralized 
commerce.   
 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
 
As cryptocurrencies evolve, increasing evidence suggests that they can 
establish and support core functions that are currently sub-optimally 
provided in the centralized economies of emerging markets. 
Cryptocurrencies can provide more than just stability for the cryptocurrency 
market as a safe harbor for investors. It is possible that in certain countries, 
stable cryptocurrencies can function, as they evolve over time, as a 
supplement or even replacement for paper fiat currency.  
Yet, many open questions need to be answered as the technology and 
associated stability designs evolve. While a progressively growing body of 
literature on cryptocurrencies is focused on technical aspects and 
implementation, some recent studies have approached the subject from a 
monetary economics perspective. One such noteworthy study is by 
Fernandez-Villaverde and Sanches162 who use the celebrated framework of 
Lagos and Wright163 to conduct a theoretical investigation of the issue of 
price stability in a world of competing private currencies, among other 
subjects.  
Fernandez-Villaverde and Sanches’s work164 provides significant 
insights that merit further research. They show that profit-maximizing 
issuers of cryptocurrencies, in order to benefit from seignorage, will in 
general be motivated to keep increasing the quantity of a cryptocurrency, 
thereby driving down the value of the currency to zero over time.165 Even 
under conditions in which a stable equilibrium is possible, self-fulfilling 
inflationary expectations cannot be ruled out. The authors argue that even 
 
 
162. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Daniel R. Sanches, On the Economics of Digital Currencies 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 18-7, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117347 [https://perma.cc/DZW8-AKE3]. 
163. Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy 
Analysis, J. Pol. Econ. 463 (2005). 
164. Fernández-Villaverde & Sanches, supra note 162.  
165. Id. 
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in cases such as Bitcoin with a preprogrammed growth rate, the system is 
unlikely to result in a socially optimal outcome. In their model, private 
cryptocurrencies are in general socially wasteful, and hinder monetary 
policy implementation; the government can implement an efficient 
allocation only by driving out private money from the economy.  
Another interesting study of cryptocurrency prices and the impact on 
monetary policy of competition between a cryptocurrency and fiat money 
is by Schilling and Uhlig.166 They consider a setting consisting of a 
cryptocurrency – which they refer to as “Bitcoin” – and an official currency 
– which they refer to as the “Dollar.” The main difference between these 
two varieties of money is that Bitcoin production is decentralized while the 
supply of Dollars is controlled by a Central Bank with the objective of 
achieving an inflation target. The analysis reveals that under different 
conditions, Bitcoin prices may, in expectational terms, increase or decrease 
or stay the same over time.167 The study goes on to investigate the 
interaction between Bitcoin prices and monetary policy. For the purposes of 
this article, the important result is that it is possible for official money and 
cryptocurrencies to co-exist in a manner consistent with stability. 
In light of the trends examined in this paper, the authors expect a world 
in which cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies may offer different benefits, 
complement one another, and provide more functions than just serving as 
media of exchange. For future research in this evolving field, a particular 
emphasis should be placed on open questions pertaining to real-world 
applications and the uses of cryptocurrencies over time.  
  
 
 
166. Linda Schilling & Harald Uhlig, Some Simple Bitcoin Economics (Becker Friedman Institute 
for Research in Economics Working Paper No. 2018-21, 2019),https://ssrn.com/abstract=3155310 
[https://perma.cc/BQ4T-UXY3].  
167. Id. 
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